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Abstract
The location of facilities in order to provide service for customers is a well-studied problem in the operations
research literature. In the basic model, there is a predefined cost for opening a facility and also for connecting
a customer to a facility, the goal being to minimize the total cost. Often, both in the case of public facilities
(such as libraries, municipal swimming pools, fire stations, ...) and private facilities (such as distribution centers,
switching stations, ...), we may want to find a ‘fair’ allocation of the total cost to the customers — this is known
as the cost allocation problem. A central question in cooperative game theory is whether the total cost can be
allocated to the customers such that no coalition of customers has any incentive to build their own facility or to
ask a competitor to service them.
We establish strong connections between fair cost allocations and linear programming relaxations for several
variants of the facility location problem. In particular, we show that a fair cost allocation exists if and only if there
is no integrality gap for a corresponding linear programming relaxation; this was only known for the simplest
unconstrained variant of the facility location problem. Moreover, we introduce a subtle variant of randomized
rounding and derive new proofs for the existence of fair cost allocations for several classes of instances. We
also show that it is in general NP-complete to decide whether a fair cost allocation exists and whether a given
allocation is fair.
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1 Introduction
Fair cost allocations. In the facility location problem, customers from a given set N are in need of a certain
service which can be provided by connecting them to facilities. These facilities could be railway stations, sports
complexes, libraries, switching stations, antennas, or supermarkets, to cite a few examples. From a given set F of
possible locations for the facilities, one has to decide first which facilities to open (build) and then each customer
must be assigned (connected) to an open facility. Opening facility i  F causes a fixed cost f i

0 and the cost for
connecting customer j  N to this facility is denoted by ci j

0. We refer to this problem as the unconstrained
(or uncapacitated) facility location problem; this problem is also sometimes referred to as the uncapacitated plant
location problem.
In many situations, further constraints have to be taken into consideration. The facilities can typically handle
only a limited number of customers, say at most ki customers for facility i. Certain customers cannot be assigned
to certain facilities (for example, if they are geographically too far apart from each other); this can be handled in
the original unconstrained model by simply letting the corresponding cost ci j be very large (or infinite). Other
relevant constraints can occur when the set of customers is heterogeneous and some quota must be met: At least
some fraction of the customers connected to a facility must belong to a certain subgroup or minority (e. g., at least
40% walloons, 33% socio-democrats, an equal number of women and men, etc.). Or, members of different groups
cannot be assigned to the same facility (e. g., each facility represents a factory that can produce only one product
and customers request one of the different products).
From a central authority’s point of view, it is interesting to ask for a cheapest possible solution, i. e., to minimize
the total cost which is made up by the cost to build facilities and to connect the customers to the open facilities.
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This facility location problem has attracted much attention in the operations research literature, see for example
the book Mirchandani and Francis (1990).
Facility location games. We can also ask whether the total cost can be allocated to the different customers in a
fair way. This is known as the cost allocation problem. For example, towns would pay for the building of libraries,
or sports complexes, but they don’t want to pay more than their fair share of the total cost, whatever that means. In
the area of cooperative game theory, see for example Moulin (1995), fairness means that no group of customers,
or coalition, has any incentive to break apart and obtain the service on their own. In other words, if v j denotes
the price being paid by customer j, we would like that ∑ j   S v j  OPT  S  where S is any subset of customers and
OPT  S  represents the cost of providing the service only to the customers in S. The core of the cooperative game is
then defined as
core  v : ∑
j   N





OPT  S  for all S  N  (1)
and a central question in cooperative game theory is whether the core is non-empty, and if so, how to find an
allocation vector in the core. Traditionally, the non vacuity of the core is established by showing that the game is
balanced (for definitions, see Moulin (1995)). In linear programming terms, this boils down to showing that any
extreme point of the dual to max∑ j   N v j subject to (1) has value at least OPT  N  . It is well known and easy to
check that, for a submodular function OPT 
	  (i. e., OPT  S  OPT  T   OPT  S  T  OPT  S  T  for all S  T  N),
the core is non-empty and the Shapley value (cf. Moulin (1995)) lies in the core. However, it is also known that
this condition is in general not satisfied for the facility location game under consideration. In Figure 1 we give a
facility location instance for which the function OPT 	 is not submodular; nevertheless, the core is non-empty in
this example.
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Figure 1: An instance with two facilities (squares) and three customers a, b and c (circles). The cost for opening a
facility is 1 and the connection costs are given by the distances in the drawn graph. Notice that the function OPT 	
is not submodular since OPT  a  b  c  OPT  b  OPT  a  b  OPT  b  c  . The unique element in the core
is given by va  vc  2 and vb  1.
Related LP relaxations. When the core is empty, we would like instead to recover as much as possible and
maximize ∑ j   N v j subject to the constraints (1). Observe that this is a linear program (LP) but the constraints
defining it are not only exponential in number but also not well characterized since the right-hand-side value
OPT  S  is an NP-hard quantity for general facility location problems. However, the value of this linear program is
a lower bound on the optimum value OPT  N  and thus it can be viewed as a relaxation of the problem.
In this paper, for any kind of constrained facility location problem, we show how to derive an equivalent
relaxation in the natural space of variables which contains a variable yi denoting whether facility i is open and a
variable xi j denoting whether customer j is assigned to facility i. In general, our result thus says that the core is non-
empty if and only if this canonical LP relaxation has no integrality gap for the objective function being considered,
i. e., the optimum LP value is equal to OPT  N  . This result and the canonical LP relaxation are described in
Section 2.
For the unconstrained facility location problem, this canonical relaxation turns out to simply be a classical
LP relaxation of the problem, a result first derived by Kolen (1983). Kolen shows that the dual of this classical
LP relaxation for the uncapacitated case can be interpreted as the maximum amount that can be allocated to
the customers subject to the constraints (1) and, as a result, the core is non-empty if and only if there is no
integrality gap for this relaxation. Our approach is similar and allows to derive (implicitly, and in some cases,
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explicitly) this canonical relaxation for any facility location problem. Chardaire (1998) also considers the classical
LP relaxation of the uncapacitated facility location problem and shows that the associated game can be viewed
as a linear production game that satisfies Owen’s additivity assumption (Owen 1995). As a result, he derives that
the core of this linear programming game is non-empty, and hence the core of the original uncapacitated facility
location game is non-empty if the LP relaxation has no integrality gap. Furthermore, he uses Kolen’s result to
derive the converse statement. Chardaire also generalizes some of his results to variants of the capacitated facility
location problem but does not characterize the canonical relaxation whose absence of integrality gap is a necessary
and sufficient condition for non emptiness of the core. We refer the reader to Chardaire for a discussion of related
work of Sharkey (1990) on a similar revenue game and of Göthe-Lundgren, Jörnsten, and Värbrand (1996) on a
set partitioning game.
Connections between the core and certain LP relaxations have also been found for other cooperative games
related to problems in combinatorial optimization. Deng, Ibaraki, and Nagamochi (1999) consider general packing
and covering games given through integer linear programs (ILP) with a  0  1  -matrix and right hand side all ones;
they show that the core of such a game is non-empty if and only if the natural LP relaxation of the ILP has an integer
optimal solution. Moreover, they give applications of this general result for various games on graphs related to well-
known combinatorial optimization problems, such as maximum flow, maximum matching, coloring, and others;
see also Deng, Ibaraki, Nagamochi, and Zang (2000). The result of Kolen (1983) on the unconstrained facility
location game can also be derived from this more general framework since the unconstrained facility location
problem can be formulated as such a covering problem, see, e. g., Ageev (1983) (cited in Grishukhin (1994)) or
Kolen and Tamir (1990). Further results in this direction have for example been derived by Faigle and Kern (2000)
and Samet and Zemel (1984).
In contrast to the earlier results mentioned above, we develop our results and techniques in a setting which
allows us to handle not only the unconstrained facility location problem but also arbitrarily constrained variants of
it. Moreover, in comparison to Kolen (1983) and Chardaire (1998), our proof is more straightforward. For general
facility location problems, we can in certain cases give an explicit representation of the canonical relaxation in
terms of linear inequalities. However, even if we are unable to completely characterize the relaxation in terms of
linear inequalities, we can nevertheless find a fair allocation that maximizes the amount recovered provided that
we can find the best feasible assignment of customers to a single facility. This is discussed in Section 3.
Non-emptiness of the core for special cases. In Section 4, we provide new proofs showing that the core of the
unconstrained facility location game is non-empty for two special cases, one in which the facilities can be ordered
on a line and the connection costs are unimodal (i. e., first decreasing and then increasing), and the other when
the facilities are positioned on a tree and the connection costs are obtained by applying a nondecreasing function
(depending on the customer) to the tree metric. These results have been obtained earlier by Trubin (1976) (see also
Grishukhin (1994)) and also by Kolen (1983) (see also Kolen and Tamir (1990) and Cornuéjols, Nemhauser, and
Wolsey (1990)).
Our main contribution in this section is a different proof technique. We use randomized rounding to show that
the canonical relaxation has no integrality gap for these special classes of instances. The randomized rounding is
performed in a dependent way by assigning subsets of   0  1  to each facility and to each connection of customers
to facilities. This algorithmic proof technique is of independent interest. For example, it can be applied to simplify
a recent result of Bar-Noy, Guha, Naor, and Schieber (1999). Or it can be used to derive the result of Shmoys and
Tardos (1993) on the generalized assignment problem without the need for explicitly solving a matching problem,
in a way more similar to Lenstra, Shmoys, and Tardos (1990). For the case of facility location on a line with
unimodal connection costs, our randomized rounding approach is closely related to a technique introduced by
Bertsimas, Teo, and Vohra (1999) to prove the integrality of an LP formulation of the uncapacitated lot-sizing
problem.
Complexity results. In Section 5, we show that even for the unconstrained facility location problem, testing
whether there is an integral optimal solution (or no integrality gap) to the canonical LP relaxation is actually NP-
complete. Our proof also yields that checking whether a given cost allocation is in the core is an NP-complete
problem. On the other hand, if the core is known to be non-empty, the latter problem can be solved in polynomial
time and an element of the core can also be computed in polynomial time.
Deng, Ibaraki, and Nagamochi (1999) derive similar results for different games on graphs (see Table 1 in
their paper); surprisingly, there seems to be no direct correlation between the complexity of those questions for
cooperative games and the complexity of the corresponding combinatorial optimization problems. Further results
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in this direction have been obtained, e. g., by Deng and Papadimitriou (1994) and by Faigle, Fekete, Hochstättler,
and Kern (1997).
Known results on the size of the integrality gap. Since for the uncapacitated facility location problem the
optimal value of the classical LP relaxation is equal to the maximum amount that can be recovered in the cost
allocation problem, results on the worst case ratio of the integrality gap gain a new meaning in the context of
cost allocation. It follows for example from the LP-based approximation result of Chudak (1998) that, for metric
instances (i. e., when the costs ci j arise from a metric on N  F), there always exists a fair cost allocation that
recovers at least a fraction e   e  2  0  576 of the total cost. On the other hand, Guha and Khuller (1998) give a
class of metric instances where at most 68% of the total cost can be recovered. This gives worst-case bounds on the
amount that the central authority should subsidize in order to ensure the existence of a fair allocation. However, for
general cost functions, there exist instances for which the amount one can recover is at most OPT  N  2nn  1 1log2  n  1 
(using a standard reduction from the set cover problem and using instances with large integrality gaps for the set
cover problem, see Vazirani (1999)).
Extension to a closely related problem. A problem that is closely related to the facility location problem occurs
when connections of customers to facilities do not cause costs ci j but produce certain non-negative benefits bi j.
Here, a customer can be connected to at most one facility and the goal is to maximize the total benefit minus the
cost for building facilities. In the corresponding cooperative game we ask for a fair allocation of this amount to the
customers, i. e., each coalition of customers wants to get at least as much as it could gain on its own. The results in
this paper can easily be carried forward to this setting.
2 Integer and linear programming formulations
In order to model the facility location problem we introduce two types of binary variables: For each i  F , the
variable yi is 1 if facility i is opened and 0 otherwise; for each i

F and j  N, the variable xi j is 1 if customer
j is connected to facility i and 0 otherwise. A minimum cost solution to the basic version of the facility location









xi j  1 for all j  N, (2)
yi  xi j  0 for all i  F, j  N, (3)
xi j  yi   0  1  for all i  F, j  N.
Constraints (2) ensure that every customer is connected to exactly one facility. A customer can only be connected






0 for all i  F . (4)
If at least a fraction qi of the customers connected to facility i have to belong to a subgroup N 	  N, we add the
quota constraints:
 1  qi  ∑
j   N 

xi j  qi ∑




0 for all i  F . (5)
If the set of customers is partitioned into subsets Np, p  1   l, and a facility can only serve customers in at most
one subset, we add the incompatibility constraints:
xi j  xik  yi for all i  F , all j  Np and all k  Nq, p  q. (6)
Notice that constraints (4), (5) and (6) do not introduce a coupling between different facilities but can be expressed
solely in terms of the variables xi j and yi for each fixed facility i. We consider a more general class of constraints
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where, for each facility i, we are given a family of subsets S  N of customers that can be connected to this facility.
In this case we can rewrite the integer program as: minimize ∑i fiyi  ∑i   j ci jxi j subject to ∑i xi j  1 for all j  N




, and Pi   0  1  n  1 is given by
Pi :   0   0     1  χS  : S  N feasible for i 
where χS
  0  1  n denotes the characteristic vector of the subset S.
There are several possible ways of deriving a linear programming relaxation for this problem. The most natural
would be to try to replace each discrete set Pi by its convex hull conv  Pi  . Notice that the value of the resulting
linear program might not be equal to OPT  N  since the intersection of the convex hulls with the hyperplanes (2)
is not necessarily the convex hull of the intersections. A slightly weaker relaxation would be to replace each Pi
by its conic hull cone  Pi   ∑x   Pi λxx : λx

0  . Given the special form of Pi, it is easy to see that conv  Pi 







(LP) subject to ∑
i   F
xi j  1 for all j  N, (7)
 yi  xi    cone  Pi  for all i  F.
We now turn to the cost allocation problem. For each coalition S  N, let OPT  S  denote the minimum cost of
the facility location problem restricted to the set of customers S. The maximum cost that can be allocated to the








OPT  S  for all S  N. (8)
It is an easy observation that the amount v j that is paid by customer j in an optimal cost allocation is always
nonnegative (since ci j

0 implies OPT  S   OPT  S   j  ). Although there are exponentially many constraints
and although it is in general NP-hard to compute the right hand side of this linear program, we show that in some
cases it can be solved in polynomial time. To obtain this result we develop the following connection to the LP
relaxation of the facility location problem introduced above.
Theorem 2.1. The cost allocation problem (CAP) is equivalent to the dual of the LP relaxation (LP) of the facility
location problem. In particular, their values are equal and the core is non-empty if and only if there is no integrality
gap for the relaxation (LP) of the facility location problem.
Proof. We dualize constraints (7) and introduce a vector v of corresponding dual variables v j for all customers
j

N. This leads to the following program of the same value as (LP) by strong duality; see, e. g., (Nemhauser and









 ci j  v j  xi j  ∑
j   N
v j
subject to  yi  xi    cone  Pi  for all i  F .
For a fixed vector v, the program is decomposed into the sum of n  N  linear minimization problems over
pointed cones. Therefore, the inner minimization problem is either unbounded or an optimum solution is given
by xi j  yi  0, for all i  F , j  N, and has value ∑ j v j. Moreover, since cone  Pi  is generated by the incidence
vectors of feasible assignments to facility i, the inner minimization problem is unbounded if and only if there exists
an i  F and a corresponding feasible coalition S  N, i. e.,  1  χS   Pi, with
fi  ∑
j   S
 ci j  v j  0 
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ci j for all i
 F and S  N feasible. (9)
Since the right hand side of constraints (8) is stronger than the right hand side of (9), it remains to show that (8) is
implicitly contained in (9). Suppose that an optimal solution to the subproblem induced by S is given by
OPT  S   ∑






where F 	  F and the Si, i  F 	 , form a partition of S. Now observe that (8) can be obtained by simply aggregating
constraints (9) over i  F 	 for S  Si. This completes the proof.
Let us turn to describing cone  Pi  for a few special cases. For the unconstrained facility location problem,
the conic hull of the set Pi is given by cone  Pi    yi  xi   : 0  xi j  yi for all j  N  ; this yields the following














yi for all i
 F, j  N.
Notice that there exists an optimal solution to this LP relaxation with yi

1 for all i  F . In this case, having
replaced Pi by cone  Pi  rather than conv  Pi  does not matter. This is no longer true if we turn to the capacitated
version of the facility location problem including constraints (4); in this case we get








yi for all j

N 
such that we only have to add the constraints (4) to the above LP relaxation.
Consider an example with two facilities of capacity 1 and fixed cost 0 and two customers that are located at the
first facility; they can be connected to this facility for free while the connection to the second facility costs 1. In an
optimal solution one of the customers has to be connected to the second facility which causes cost 1; however, an
optimal LP solution has value 0 since it can open the first facility with y1  2 and connect both customers to this
facility. If we add the constraint y1

1 to the LP relaxation, its optimum value increases to 1.
In fact, in this example, none of the customers is willing to pay anything for the service since he can argue that
he could connect to the first facility for free. Therefore, the cost allocation problem is equivalent to the dual of the
weak LP relaxation but not to the dual of the stronger relaxation including constraints yi

1 for all i  F, which
would have been obtained if we had relaxed Pi to conv  Pi  . This answers an open question discussed by Chardaire
(1998).
If, instead of capacity constraints, we have that each facility must serve the same number of customers from
N1 and from N2, then we simply have that:
cone  Pi    yi  xi   : ∑
j   N1
xi j  ∑
j   N2




yi for all j

N  
If we have incompatibility constraints xi j  xik  yi for certain pairs  j  k   Ei as in (6), we need to include all
inequalities that describe (the conic version of) the stable set polytope for the graph  N  Ei  . For the specific form
(6), the corresponding graph is a complete l-partite graph, and therefore the clique constraints
∑
p
xi j  p   yi for all  j  1   j  2    j  l  

N1  N2    Nl
are sufficient since the graph is perfect; see Grötschel, Lovász, and Schrijver (1988).
However, if we consider quota constraints (5) or we combine simultaneously say capacity constraints (4) and
incompatibility constraints (6), then additional more complicated inequalities are needed to describe the conic hull.
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3 Polynomial-time solvability of the cost allocation problem
As a result of Theorem 2.1, the cost allocation problem (CAP) can be solved in polynomial time by linear pro-
gramming if we know a compact (i. e., with a polynomial number of linear inequalities) representation of the cones
generated by the Pi’s. In this case, an element of the core can simply be obtained by solving (LP) and extracting
the dual variables on the constraints (7).
Even if we don’t know or there doesn’t exist a compact (possibly extended) representation of each cone, we can
still solve the cost allocation problem in polynomial time provided we can optimize in polynomial time over each
discrete set Pi. This can be done by using the ellipsoid method and exploiting the equivalence between optimization
and separation, see Grötschel, Lovász, and Schrijver (1988). Since we have a polynomial bound on the size of the
inequalities needed to describe (CAP), the equivalence is between strong (or exact) optimization and separation.
The separation problem associated to (CAP) is given a vector v to decide whether there exists a set S  N such
that ∑ j   S v j  OPT  S  , and if so to find one such set. By the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 2.1, this is
equivalent to deciding whether there exists i  F and a feasible S for i such that
fi  ∑
j   S
 ci j  v j  0 
And this can be decided by optimizing over Pi.
Similarly if we have a polynomial approximation scheme for the Pi’s then we can derive a polynomial ap-
proximation scheme for (CAP). This is for example useful when the customers have different demands, say d j for






4 On the existence of core elements
In the literature, positive and negative results on the existence of elements in the core have been shown for several
important classes of instances. In view of the result in Theorem 2.1, we provide a novel variant of randomized
rounding in order to give new and simple proofs for the existence of integral solutions for the LP relaxation of
facility location problems in certain cases. Randomized rounding is a well known technique in combinatorial
optimization for turning a fractional solution into an integer solution making use of the structural information
contained in the fractional solution; we refer the reader to Motwani and Raghavan (1995) for further information.
For the unconstrained facility location problem, we take an optimum solution  x  y  to the LP relaxation dis-
cussed in Section 2 and try to round it randomly to a feasible integral solution by interpreting the fractional values
xi j and yi as probabilities. A similar technique was used by Chudak (1998) to compute near-optimal solutions for
metric instances. However, while Chudak opened facilities randomly with probabilities yi but established connec-
tions by a different routine, the main problem for our approach is to make sure that a variable xi j is only rounded
to 1 if facility i is open, i. e., if the variable yi is also rounded to 1. This condition forces a coupling of the random
decisions which makes it necessary to introduce a subtle correlation between the different random variables.




of Ii is equal to
yi. Later, we will draw a random variable α uniformly distributed from   0  1  and open all facilities i with α  Ii;
in fact, the probability for opening facility i is then equal to yi. In order to determine the connections of customers
j to facilities i, we construct subsets Ii j of   0  1  such that

Ii j
  xi j and establish a connection from customer j
to facility i if α  Ii j. To make sure that each customer is connected to exactly one facility, the subsets Ii j, i

F,
should form a partition of the interval   0  1  ; notice that ∑i   F

Ii j
  ∑i   F xi j  1 by constraints (10). Moreover,
since a customer should only be connected to an open facility, we require Ii j  Ii for all i  F , j  N.
Lemma 4.1. Given an optimum solution  x  y  to the LP relaxation of the unconstrained facility location problem,







  xi j, for all i  F, j  N;
ii)   i   F Ii j    0  1  , for all j  N, and Ii j  Ii 
 j  /0, for all i  i 	  F, j  N;
iii) Ii j  Ii, for all i  F, j  N;
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then there exists an integral optimal solution to the LP relaxation.
Proof. We randomly construct an integral solution  x̄  ȳ  : Choose a random variable α uniformly distributed from
  0  1  ; open all facilities i with α  Ii (i. e., set ȳi  1) and establish all connections i j with α  Ii j (i. e., set x̄i j  1).





fi ȳi  ∑
i  F
j  N





ci jxi j  OPTLP 
This expected value is a convex combination of the values of all integral solutions corresponding to possible choices
of α. In particular, there exists an integral solution whose value is upper bounded by the optimum LP value.
4.1 Facility location on a line with unimodal connection costs
We apply this proof technique to unconstrained facility location problems where all facilities can be ordered in
such a way that, for any customer j, the connection costs ci j are unimodal as a function of i. This means that
there exists an ordering 1   m of the facilities and for any customer j, there exists a facility i  j  such that ci j
is nonincreasing for i

i  j  and nondecreasing for i  i  j  . This is for example the case when all facilities are
located on a line in the plane or a higher dimensional Euclidean space and the connection cost between customer j
and facility i is a nondecreasing function of their Euclidean distance (see Figure 2). As an illustration, this situation
Figure 2: The unimodal case with facilities on a line; the rectangles represent facilities while the circles correspond
to customers.
occurs when we have a (straight) railway line and the problem is to decide where to build railway stations so as to
provide an optimal service to the inhabitants of the region around the railway line.
Theorem 4.2 (Trubin (1976), Kolen (1983)). There is no integrality gap for the unconstrained facility location
problem with unimodal connection costs; in particular, the core is non-empty in this case.
Proof. In the following we assume without loss of generality that the optimal LP solution  x  y  fulfills yi  1, for
all i  F , and has the following property: If facility i lies between facility i  j  and facility i 	 and is distinct from i 	
(i. e., i  j   i  i 	 or i 	  i  i  j  ) and xi 
 j  0, then xi j  yi. Otherwise one can modify the solution accordingly
by increasing xi j and simultaneously decreasing xi 
 j without an increase in cost since ci j  ci 
 j. In particular, this
implies that xi  j  j  yi  j  for all j

N.
Let a0 :  0 and ai :  ∑ik  1 yk, for i  1   m, and assign the set Ii :     ai  1  ai  mod 1     0  1  to facility i.
Notice that by construction

Ii
  yi. We also assign to each pair formed by a facility i and a customer j a subset of
measure xi j:
Ii j :    ai  xi j  ai  mod 1 if i  i  j  ,  ai  1  ai  1  xi j  mod 1 if i  i  j  .
Notice that Ii  j  j    ai  j 	 1  ai  j    Ii  j  since xi  j  j  yi  j  . The fact that xi j  yi implies that Ii j  Ii. Moreover, by
our assumption on the LP solution  x  y  , the subsets Ii j, i  F , form a partition of the interval   0  1  for each fixed
customer j. Therefore, the sets Ii and Ii j fulfill the conditions of Lemma 4.1 and the result follows.
Notice that in the unimodal case the cost functions for the connections along the line are not necessarily
symmetric around i  j  . An important application with non-symmetric connection costs is the lot sizing problem:
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The line represents a time axis and facilities and customers correspond to discrete points in time when a product
can be produced and has to be delivered, respectively. In particular, if we don’t allow backlogging, a customer can
only be served by a facility ‘in the past’, i. e., on its left hand side on the line. In this case, Theorem 4.2 was proved
by Krarup and Bilde (1977).
The result in Theorem 4.2 cannot be generalized to the capacitated version of the problem. This follows from
the example discussed in Section 2 that can obviously be realized on a line and where the customers are not willing
to pay anything although the cost of an optimum solution is positive.
In the case where the facilities are located on a line and each facility must serve the same number of customers
from N1 and from N2, the core can also be empty. Consider the example given in Figure 3 where the same numbers
of women and men have to be served by each facility. The fixed cost for opening a facility is 1. The cost for
Figure 3: An instance of the facility location problem on a line where each facility has to serve the same number
of women and men; the core is empty.
connecting a customer to a facility is equal to the corresponding distance (number of edges on the shortest path)
in the graph given by the dotted edges. In an optimal solution, all facilities are opened resulting in total cost
9. However, in the LP relaxation we can open the facility in the middle with fraction 1   2 and also connect the
neighboring customers with fraction 1   2; the optimal LP value is therefore only 17   2. It also follows from this
example that in the more general case of quota constraints (5) the core can be empty.
4.2 Facility location on a cycle
Another possible direction for generalizing the result in Theorem 4.2 is to switch to more complicated topologies
than the line. However, it has been observed by Tamir (1992, Example 1) (see also Kolen and Tamir (1990,
Example 6.3)) that already instances defined on a cycle with unimodal connection costs can have an empty core;
we say that the connection costs on a cycle are unimodal if, for each customer j, opening the cycle at a facility
i with maximum ci j yields an unimodal cost function on the resulting line. In the example given in Figure 4 the
Figure 4: An instance of the facility location problem on a cycle with empty core.
fixed cost for opening each facility is 2 and the connection cost between a customer and a facility is equal to their
distance in the cyclic graph. An optimal solution opens two facilities and has total cost 7. However, the optimum
solution to the LP relaxation opens each facility with fraction 1   2 and has value 6. Notice that the sum of the yi’s
is equal to 3   2 and thus not integral in this case.
Theorem 4.3. If there exists an optimum solution to the LP relaxation with ∑i   F yi    , then there is no integrality
gap for the unconstrained facility location problem with unimodal connection costs on a cycle; in particular, the
core is non-empty in this case.
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Proof. The proof is a straightforward generalization of the proof of Theorem 4.2. We assume that the facilities
1   m are ordered clockwise along the cycle and define the sets Ii exactly as in the proof of Theorem 4.2. Notice
that am  ∑i   F yi   a0 mod 1  in this case. In order to assign subsets to the connections i j for a fixed customer
j, we ‘open’ the cycle at a facility with maximum ci j yielding a line and construct the sets Ii j again as in the proof
of Theorem 4.2 (using the same assumption on the optimum LP solution). The resulting sets Ii and Ii j fulfill the
conditions of Lemma 4.1 and the result follows.
The rounding technique in the proof of Theorem 4.3 has been applied before by Bertsimas, Teo, and Vohra
(1999) to prove the integrality of an LP relaxation of the k-median problem on cycles. The insight from Theo-
rem 4.3 can be used to prove the following result.
Corollary 4.4. The unconstrained facility location problem with unimodal connection costs on a cycle can be
solved in polynomial time.
Proof. We add the constraint ∑i yi
   to the LP relaxation. It follows from the proof of Theorem 4.3 that an
optimal solution to this stronger relaxation can be turned into an integral optimal solution in polynomial time.
Moreover, the stronger relaxation can be solved in the following way: let γ :  ∑i y

i for an optimum solution of
the original  LP  . Then there exists an optimal solution to the stronger relaxation with ∑i yi  

γ   γ   ; this
follows from the fact that the optimal value of the parametric linear program which we get by adding the constraint
∑i yi  µ to  LP  is a convex function of µ, see, e. g., (Padberg 1995, Section 6.5). Therefore we only need to solve
this relaxation for the two values µ   γ  and µ  γ  and take the better of the two solutions.
An alternative proof of Corollary 4.4 is based on the following observation. As we already mentioned in the
introduction, the unconstrained facility location problem can be formulated as a covering problem (see Kolen and
Tamir (1990)). Since the connection costs are unimodal, the rows in the linear programming formulation of this
covering problem fulfill the circular 1’s property (for definition, see Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin (1993, Chapter 9,
Exercise 9.9)). If we add the constraint ∑i yi  p for some p 	 (p can for example be determined by binary
search), it is an easy exercise to show that an integral optimal solution exists since the matrix of the linear program
is totally unimodular, see Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin (1993, Chapter 9, Exercise 9.9).
The above discussion has also implications for the p-median problem, where the number of facilities to open
is a given integral number p. The proof of Theorem 4.2 shows that the corresponding LP relaxation (with the
inequality ∑i   F yi  p) has an integral optimum solution for instances defined on a cycle with unimodal costs; a
generalization of a result first derived by Oudjit (1981) (for linear costs).
4.3 Facility location on a tree
In the following we consider unconstrained facility location problems on trees where all customers and facilities
are located on the vertices of an acyclic connected graph. As for the case of a line, we assume that the connection
costs ci j of each customer j are monotone such that ci j

ci 
 j if facility i lies on the unique path between j and
facility i 	 . Unfortunately, this condition is not sufficient to guarantee a non-empty core. The counterexample in
Figure 5 consists of three customers and three facilities. The fixed cost of each facility is 1 and each customer can
be connected to the facility at the same vertex of the tree or to its anti-clockwise neighbor for free; a connection
to its clockwise neighbor, however, costs a large amount M. An optimum solution opens two of the three facilities
and has value 2. In an optimum LP solution, however, each facility is opened with fraction 1   2 resulting in total





Figure 5: An instance of the unconstrained facility location problem on a tree with monotone connection costs but
empty core.
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In the following we restrict to a special class of monotone connection costs on a tree: Let d : E   0 be a
distance function on the edges of the tree. We denote the length of the unique path between two vertices i and j of
the tree by di j.
Theorem 4.5 (Trubin (1976), Kolen (1983)). If for each customer j the costs ci j for connecting j to facilities
i  F is an arbitrary nondecreasing function (possibly dependent on j) of the distances di j in an underlying tree
metric, then there is no integrality gap for the unconstrained facility location problem and the core is non-empty.
Using the same technique as in the proofs of Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 4.1, one can show that, for the class of
instances under consideration, any feasible solution to the LP relaxation can be written as a convex combination of
integral solutions. In particular, all vertices of the underlying polyhedron are integral. This result also follows from
the work of Trubin (1976) (see also Grishukhin (1994)), Kolen (1983) (see also Kolen and Tamir (1990)) or Bárány,
Edmonds, and Wolsey (1986) (see also Cornuéjols, Nemhauser, and Wolsey (1990)). They use a simple reduction
of the unconstrained facility location problem to the set cover problem. For the class of instances considered in
Theorem 4.5, the constraint matrix of the resulting set cover problem is totally balanced which yields the integrality
result. Moreover, Trubin and also Kolen give an O   N   F   3  algorithm for solving such instances. This result
has been improved by Gimadi (1983) to running time O   N   F   2  . Furthermore, Ageev (1992) and Granot and
Skorin-Karpov (1994) gave a polynomial-time algorithm for solving the unconstrained facility location problem
on partial k-trees for fixed k.
Tamir (1992) considers a variant of the facility location problem on a tree where each customer j has to be
connected to a facility within a given distance r j. This constraint can be modeled by letting ci j  0 if the distance
between customer j and facility i is at most r j and ci j  ∞, otherwise; thus it is a special case of the problem
discussed above. Tamir proves the result given in Theorem 4.5 for this special case.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. We construct sets Ii and Ii j that fulfill the conditions in Lemma 4.1. To simplify the presen-
tation of the construction, we assume that there is at least one customer at each node of the tree; otherwise we can,
without loss of generality, add dummy customers j with ci j  0 for all i  F. For each customer j we order the set
of facilities F by nondecreasing distances di j and break ties according to increasing indices i  1   m. Using the
same arguments given in the proof of Theorem 4.2, we can restrict to LP solutions with the following property: If
facility i is closer to customer j than facility i 	 (with respect to the above ordering) and xi 
 j  0, then xi j  yi. As
an immediate consequence of this we get the following property (*): If customer k lies on the unique path from
customer j to facility i, then xi j

xik. In particular, if two customers j and j 	 are located at the same node of the
tree, we get xi j  xi j 
 for all i  F. Therefore, all customers j located at the same node will get the same sets Ii j
and we will only consider one customer per node in the following construction.
To assign subsets Ii and Ii j to the facilities and connections, respectively, we traverse the nodes of the tree in
such a way that the first k visited nodes form a subtree for any k. This can, e. g., be done by rooting the tree at some
node and traversing the nodes of the tree by depth- or breadth-first search or in any order such that the predecessor
of any node is visited before the node itself. During the algorithm we preserve the following invariant (**):
For all customers j at visited nodes of the tree, the subsets Ii j, i

F , form a partition of the interval
  0  1  such that  Ii j
  xi j and Ii j  Ii. Moreover, for all i  F , there exists a visited node j such that
Ii j  Ii. for all i  F .





For the customer j at the root of the tree, we set Ii :  Ii j :    ∑i  1k  1 xik  ∑ik  1 xik     0  1  for i  1   m. Notice
that the invariant (**) is fulfilled after this step. When we arrive at a node with a customer j, we denote the
customer located at the predecessor of the current node in the tree by k. The following observation is crucial for
the assignment of the subsets Ii and Ii j.
Claim 1. For all i  F, either xi j






We postpone the proof of this claim after the complete description of the assignment procedure.
We first consider all facilities i  F with xi j

xik and choose an arbitrary subset Ii j  Iik of measure xi j. For




by Claim 1, choose arbitrary sets Ii j  Iik of
measure xi j such that the sets Ii j, i

F, form a partition of   0  1  (this is possible since the sets Iik, i  F , form a
partition) and redefine Ii :  Ii j. Notice that the invariant (**) is still fulfilled after this step.
Thus, the final sets Ii and Ii j fulfill the conditions of Lemma 4.1 and the result follows.
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(since k has been visited). By the invariant (**), there exists
a customer h  k with Iih  Ii, implying that xik  xih. By property (*), k can neither lie on the path from j to i nor
on the path from h to i. However, since k is the predecessor of j in the tree and h was visited, k lies on the path
between j and h — a contradiction.
5 On the complexity of core computations
In this section we prove the following theorem which confirms a conjecture by Chardaire (1998).
Theorem 5.1. For general instances of the unconstrained facility location problem it is NP-complete to decide
whether the core is non-empty.
Proof. By Theorem 2.1 it suffices to show that it is NP-complete to decide whether or not the LP relaxation given
in Section 2 has an integral optimal solution. The problem is obviously in NP. To prove that it is NP-hard, we use a
reduction from 3SAT. We restrict to instances where each clause contains exactly three (not necessarily different)
literals.
Given an instance of 3SAT we construct the following facility location problem. For each variable X we
introduce one customer jX and two facilities iX and iX̄ corresponding to the two literals X and its negation X̄ . The
cost for connecting customer jX to these two facilities is 0, the cost for opening one of the facilities is equal to 1
plus the number of occurrences of the corresponding literal in the instance.
For each clause C we introduce one customer jC and for each of its three literals L a facility iCL and a customer
jCL. Customer jC can be connected to the three facilities at cost 0, the cost for opening each facility is 1; each
customer jCL can be connected either to iCL or to iL at cost 0. Finally, we introduce one additional dummy facility
i0 with fixed cost 0. The customers jCL of all clauses can connect at cost 1 to this facility. An illustrating example
















Figure 6: A facility location instance corresponding to an instance of 3SAT containing variables X , Y , and Z and a
clause C   X̄   Y   Z  .
We claim that the LP relaxation of this facility location instance has an integral optimal solution if and only if
the underlying 3SAT instance can be satisfied. We first show that the optimal LP value is n  3m where n denotes
the number of variables and m the number of clauses of the 3SAT instance. A feasible solution of value n  3m is
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given by
yiL  1   2 for each literal L,
xiX jX  xiX̄ jX  1   2 for each variable X ,
yiCL  xiCL jC  xiCL jCL  1   3
xiL jCL  1   2
yi0  xi0 jCL  1   6
   for each clause C and each of its literals L,
In order to show that this solution is optimal, we construct a dual solution of value n  3m. The dual of the LP






wi j  fi for all i  F ,
v j  wi j  ci j for all i  F , j  N,
wi j

0 for all i  F , j  N.
A feasible dual solution of value n  3m is given by
v jX  wiX jX  wiX̄ jX  1 for each variable X ,
v jC  wiCL jC  wi0 jCL  0
v jCL  wiCL jCL  wiL jCL  1

for each clause C and each of its literals L,
Since the given dual solution is optimal, every primal optimal solution has to fulfill the following complementary
slackness conditions:
xiX jX  yiX xiX̄ jX  yiX̄ for each variable X , (11)
xiCL jCL  yiCL xiL jCL  yiL for each clause C and each of its literals L. (12)
Using these conditions we can show that any primal integral optimal solution  x  y  corresponds to a satisfying
truth-assignment of the underlying 3SAT instance. Condition (11) and constraint (10) yield that for each variable
X exactly one of the facilities iX and iX̄ has to be open. We set the variable X to the value true if yiX  0 and to the
value false if yiX̄  0. For an arbitrary clause C, at least one of the three facilities iCL corresponding to the three
literals of C must be open to serve customer jC. Condition (12) yields that the customer jCL is connected to this
facility. It follows again from (12) that the facility iL is closed and the literal L is thus set to the value true such that
the clause C is fulfilled.
Using the same interpretation one can easily show that any satisfying truth-assignment yields an integral opti-
mal solution of the LP relaxation. This completes the proof.
We can state the following interesting corollary of the result in Theorem 5.1.
Corollary 5.2. Given an instance of the unconstrained facility location problem and a cost allocation vector
v
  N , it is NP-complete to decide whether or not v is in the core of the corresponding game.
Proof. The problem is in NP since a positive answer to the question can be proven in the following way: Give an
integral optimal solution to the LP relaxation and a completion w of the given vector v to an optimal dual solution
 v  w  .
Quite interestingly, given the information that the core is non-empty, it is easy to compute an element of the
core and to decide whether a given cost allocation v belongs to the core. Both problems reduce to solving the dual
of the LP relaxation of the problem.
Corollary 5.3. If the core of an unconstrained facility location game is non-empty, an element of the core can be
computed in polynomial time and it can be checked in polynomial time whether a given cost allocation v
  N
belongs to the core.
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It follows from the considerations in Section 3 that the result in Corollary 5.3 can be generalized to constrained
variants of the facility location problem for which we can optimize over the discrete sets Pi in polynomial time.
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